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GILL

v.

HEARST PuBLISHING

[L. A. No. 22038.

In Bank.

Co.

[40 C.2d

Feb. 17, 1953.]

JOHN W. GILL et al., Appellants, v. HEARST PUBLISH- .
ING COMPANY, INC. et al., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Estoppel or Waiver of Right to Urge Error.-Although plaintiffs in opposing a demurrer to a complaint relating to unauthorized publication of their photograph in
connection with a magazine article stressed that the photograph alone violated their right of privacy without regard
to its use in connection with the article, defendants may not,
on plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment entered on an order
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, successfully
urge a waiver by plaintiffs or estoppel in limitation of the
premise of their alleged damage claim where, regardless of
plaintiffs' theory of liability, the ruling of the trial court
would have been the same.
[2] Pleading-Demurrer-Amendment After Demurrer Sustained.
-Where a complaint alleges that a photograph was published
with the knowledge and consent of defendants, but there is
no allegation that the magazine article which such photograph
was used to illustrate was published with their consent, such
defect is capable of being cured by amendment, and it is
an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer to the complaint
without leave to amend.
[3] Privacy-Invasion of Right-Publication of Photograph.Mere publication of a photograph depicting man and woman
in an affectionate pose does not constitute an actionable invasion of their right of privacy.
[4] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-The right "to be let
alone" and to be protected from undesired publicity is not
absolute, but must be balanced against the public interest
in the dissemination of news and information consistent with
the democratic processes under the constitutional guaranties
of freedom of speech and of the press. (U. S. Const., Amends.
I, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.)
[5] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-The right of privacy
may not be extended to prohibit any publication of matter
which may be of public or general interest, but rather the
[2] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 77; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 298.
[3] Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 456; 14
A.L.R.2d 750. See, also, Cal.Jur., Privacy; Am.Jur., Privacy,
§ 2 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, §§ 1088, 1089;
[2] Pleading, § 103(2); [3-12] Privacy.
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general object in view is to protect the privacy of public life,
and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's
life has ceased to be private, before the publication under
consideration has been made, to that extent the protection is
to be withdrawn.
[6] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Measured.-The right
of privacy is determined by the norm of the ordinary man;
to constitute a violation of such right the alleged objectionable publication must appear offensive in the light of ordinary
sensibilities.
[7] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Determined.-Liability
for violation of the right of privacy exists only if defendant's
conduct was such that he should have realized that it would
be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities, or if the
intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency.
[8] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Measured.-Whether
there has been such an invasion of privacy as to be offensive
to persons of ordinary sensibilities is to some extent a question of law.
[9] !d.-Invasion of Right--Publication of Photograph.-The constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression apply with
equal force to publication of a photograph depicting man and
woman in an affectionate pose, whether such photograph be
a news report or an entertainment feature, and the publisher's liability accrues only in the event there has been a
wrongful invasion of the couple's right of privacy.
[10] !d.-Waiver or Loss of Right.-Where photograph was taken
of husband and wife in an affectionate pose voluntarily assumed by them at their market or place of business allegedly
"well known to persons and travelers throughout the world,"
they by their voluntary action waived their right of privacy
so far as this particular public pose was assumed, since there
can be no privacy in that which is already public.
[11] !d.-Waiver or Loss of Right.-Where husband and wife
voluntarily posed for a photograph in a public place, their
right to privacy as to this incident ceased and it in effect
became a part of the public domain, as to which they cannot
later rescind their waiver in an attempt to assert a right
of privacy.
[12] !d.-Invasion of Right--Publication of Photograph.-Photograph of man and woman sitting romantically close to one
another in a public place, the man with his arm· around the
woman, is not so uncomplimentary or discreditable that its
publication might go beyond the limits of decency and con[6] See Am.Jur., Privacy, § 12.
40 C.2d-8
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stitute a violation of the right of privacy, since such photograph depicts no more than an incident which may be seen
almost daily in ordinary life.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for invasion of privacy. Judgment
for defendants after sustaining demurrer to amended complaint without leave to amend, reversed.·
Shacknove & Goldman and Ben F. Goldman, Jr., for Appellants.
Flint & MacKay and Arch R. Tuthill for Respondents.
Loeb & Loeb; Lawler, Felix & Hall; Price, Ma.cDonald &
Knox; John Hamlyn ; Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge,
and Binford & Binford as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-As in the related case of Girt v. Curtis Pt~b.
Co., 38 Cal.2d 273 [239 P.2d 630], plaintiffs, husband and
wife, sought damages for an alleged invasion of their right of
privacy. Defendants' demurrer to the amended complaint
was sustained without leave to amend. From the judgment
accordingly entered, plaintiffs appeal. It appears that plaintiffs properly challenge the correctness of the trial court's
ruling insofar as it foreclosed their right to amend.
Plaintiffs' original complaint was predicated solely on the
charge that in the October, 1947, issue of Harper's Bazaar,
a magazine published and distributed by the corporate defendants, there appeared an unauthorized photograph of
plaintiffs taken by defendants' employee while plaintiffs were
seated in an affectionate pose at their place of business, a
confectionery and ice cream concession in !h'e Farmers' Market
in Los Angeles. This photograph was used to illustrate an
article entitled "And So the World Goes Round," a short
commentary reaffirming "the poet's conviction that the world
could not revolve without love," despite "vulgarization" of
the sentiment by some, and that ballads may still be written
about everyday people in love. A demurrer to that original
complaint was sustained on the ground that the statute of
limitations had run, but leave to amend was granted. Plain-
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tiffs do not question the propriety of that ruling. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 340, subd. 3.)
Plaintiffs thereupon amended their complaint to allege that
the same photograph was republished with defendants' consent in the May, 1949, issue of the Ladies' Home Journal,
a monthly magazine published and distributed by the Curtis
Publishing Company. The same publication was involved in
Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273. Specifically,
it is here alleged that the "picture" was republished with the
"knowledge, permission and consent" of defendants and that
''credit'' for the publication was given to and required by
defendants; that the published photograph depicts plaintiffs
in an "uncomplimentary" pose; that plaintiffs' right of
privacy was thereby invaded and plaintiffs were subjected to
humiliation and annoyance to their damage in the sum of
$25,000. While the picture was used for illustration of an
article entitled "Love" (see Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra,
p. 275), plaintiffs did not allege that defendants also consented to the publication of the article. However, a copy of
the picture, with the accompanying article, is attached as an
exhibit to the amended complaint. Defendants maintain that
since plaintiffs failed to make the direct allegation that defendants consented to the publication of the article, plaintiffs'
alleged cause of action must be deemed to rest solely on the
publication of the photograph without reference to the accompanying text or caption under the picture.
[1] It is true that in their argument in opposing defendants' demurrer to their amended complaint, plaintiffs
stressed the publication of the photograph alone as constituting a violation of their right of priva~yJ without regard to
its use in connection with the article. However, as appears
from its memorandum opinion in. sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend, the trial court attached no significance
to the matter of whether plaintiffs charged defendants with
mere consent to publication of the photograph or included
also consent to publication of the accompanying article. In
either event the trial court was of the view that there had
been no invasion of plaintiffs' right of privae,y. Under such
circumstances defendants may not successfully urge a waiver
by plaintiffs or estoppel in limitation of the premise of their
alleged damage claim. Regardless of plaintiffs' theory of
liability, the ruling· of the trial court would have been the
same-that a cause of action had not been stated. 'rherefore
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such authorities as Gorclon v. Kifer, 26 Cal.App.2d 252, 255
[79 P.2d 164] ; Alberts v. American Casu.aUy Co., 88 Cal.App.
2d 891, 896 [200 P.2d 37] ; and 2 Cal.Jur. 844-852 are not in
point.
[2] As indicated in Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38
Cal.2d 273, 279, defendants would be liable in the event of
their consent to publication of the photograph in connection
with the article in the Ladies' Home Journal. Plaintiffs
therefore maintain that any defect in the recitals of the
amended complaint with reference to defendants' connection
with the publication of the article as well as the photograph
could be easily corrected by amendment. The incorporation
of the article as an exhibit constitutes some basis for an inference that it may have been intended as an inseparable part
of the photograph in presenting the extent of plaintiffs' complaint. Moreover, the allegation of consent is broad and it
cannot be said that it necessarily negates a consent to publishing the article. The objection to plaintiffs' pleading thus
goes to the matter of effecting a clarification of an uncertainty
or an ambiguity. Manifestly, such defect is capable of being
cured by amendment. (Wenner holm v. Stanford University
School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 719 [128 P.2d 522, 141
A.hR. 1358]; Washer· v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.2d 822,
833 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338].) Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining
defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. (Wilk v.
Vencill, 30 Cal.2d 104, 109 [180 P.2d 351].)
[3] The recognition of plaintiffs' right to proceed in the
event of proper clarification involves the further observation
that mere publication of the photograph standing alone does
not constitute an actionable invasion of plaintiffs' right of
privacy. [4] The right "to be let alone" and to be protected from undesired publicity is not absolute but must be
balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of
news and information consistent with the democratic processes
under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
of the press. (U.S. Const., Amends. I, XIV; Cal. Const. art. I,
§ 9; 41 Am.Jur., Privacy, § 9, pp. 931-933; Nizer, The Right
of Pr"ivacy, i\9 Mich.Ij.Rev., 526, 528-529; Gal v. Cnrtis Pub.
Co., supra, 38 Ca1.2d 273, 277-278.) [5] The right of
privacy may not be extended to prohibit any publication of
matter which may be of public or general interest, but rather
the ''general object in view is to protect the privacy of private
life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a
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man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication
under consideration has been made, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn.'' ( Br·andeis-Warren Essay, 4 Harv.
L.Rev., 193, 215; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.
App.2d 304, 312 [95 P.2d 491] .) [6] Moreover, the right
of privacy is determined by the norm of the ordinary man;
that is to say, the alleged objectionable publication must
appear offensive in the light of "ordinary sensibilities."
(41 Am.Jur., Privacy,§ 12, p. 934.) [7] As has been said:
'' . . . liability exists only if the defendant's conduct was
such that he should have realized 'that it would be offensive
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the
intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability
accrues . . . . It is only when the defendant should know that
the plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by
the conduct that a cause of action 'exists." (Rest., Torts, Vol.
4, § 867, comment d, pp. 400-401; see, also, cases collected:
Annos. 138 A.L.R. 22, 46; 168 A.L.R. 446, 452; 14 A.L.R.2d
750, 752.) [8] Whether there has been such an offensive
invasion of privacy is ''to some extent one of law.'' ( 41 Am.
Jur., Privacy, § 12, p. 935; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434
[ 42 N.E. 22, 26, 31 A.hR. 286, 49 Am.St. Rep. 671] ; Reed
v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 64 Ariz. 294 [162 P.2d 133, 139] ;
Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198 [20 So.2d 243, 251, 168 A.L.R.
430] .)
The picture allegedly was taken at plaintiffs' "place of
business,'' a confectionery and ice cream concession in the
Farmers' Market, Los Angeles. It shows plaintiffs, a young
man and young woman, seated at a counter near a cash
register, the young woman apparently in intent thought, with
a notebook and pencil in her hands, which rest on the counter.
Plaintiffs are dressed informally and are in a romantic pose,
the young man having one arm about the young woman.
There are at least five other persons plainly visible in the
photograph in positions in close proximity to plaintiffs as
the central figures. Apparently the picture has no particular
news value but is designed to serve the functioh of entertainment as a matter of legitimate public interest. (Rest., Torts,
vol. 4, § 867, comments c and d, pp. 399-401.) [9] However,
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression apply
with equal force to the publication whether it be a news
report or an entertainment feature (Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 [58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949]; Winters v. New
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York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 [68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; United
States v. Pa.ramonnt Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 [68
S.Ct. 915,92 L.JiJd. 1260]), and defendants' liability accrues
only in the event that it can be said that there has been a
wrongful invasion of plaintiffs' right of privacy. ( Cf. Gill v.
Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273, 280.)
[10] In considering the nature of the picture in question, it is significant that it was not surreptitiously snapped
on private grounds, but rather was taken of plaintiffs in a
pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place. So distinguishable are cases such as Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo.
1199 [159 S.W.2d 291], where the picture showed plaintiff
in her bed at a hospital, which circumstance was held to
constitute an infringement of the right of privacy. Here
plaintiffs, photographed at their concession allegedly "well
known to persons and travelers throughout the world'' as
conducted for "many years" in the "world-famed" Farmers' Market, had voluntarily exposed themselves to public
gaze in a pose open to the view of any persons who might
then be at or near their place of business. By their own
voluntary action plaintiffs waived their right of privacy so
far as this particular public pose was asslimed ( 41 Am.Jur.,
Privacy, § 17, p. 937), for "there can be no privacy in that
which is already public." (Mdvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App.
285, 290 [297 P. 91].) The photograph of plaintiffs merely
permitted other members of the public, who were not at
plaintiffs' place of business at the time it was taken, to see
them as they had voluntarily exhibited themselves. [11] Consistent with their own voluntary assumption of this particular pose in a public place, plaintiffs' right to privacy as
to this photographed incident ceased and it in effect became
a part of the public domain (Brandeis-Warren Essay, 4 Harv.
L.Rev. 193, 218; ivielvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. 285,
290-291), as to which they could not later rescind their
waiver in an attempt to assert a right of privacy. (Cohen
v. Marx, 94 Cal.App.2d 704, 705 [211 P.2d 320] .) In short,
the photograph did not disclose anything which until then
had been private, but rather only extended knowledge of the
particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had
actually witnessed it at the time of occurrence.
[12] Nor does there appear to be anything "uncomplimentary" or discreditable in the photograph itself, so that
its publication might be objectionable as going "beyond the
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limits of decency" and reasonably indicate defendants' conduct to be such that they ''should have realized it would be
offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities." (Rest. Torts,
vol. 4, § 867, comment d, pp. 400-401.) Here the picture of
plaintiffs, sitting romantically close to one another, the man
with his arm around the woman, depicts no more than a portrayal of an incident which may be seen almost daily in
ordinary life-couples in a sentimental mood on public park
benches, in railroad depots or hotel lobbies, at public games,
the beaches, the theatres. Such situation is readily distinguishable from cases where the right of privacy has been
enforced with regard to the publication of a picture which
was shocking, revolting or ind,ecent in its portrayal of the
human body. (See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506 [149 S.W.
849, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 386, Ann.Cas. 1914B 374]; Bazemore v.
Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 [155 S.E. 194].) In fact,
here the photograph may very well be said to be complimentary and pleasing in its pictorial representation of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have failed to cite, and independent research
has failed to reveal, any case where the publication of a
mere photograph under the circumstances here prevailing
-a picture (1) taken in a pose voluntarily assumed in a
public place and (2) portraying nothing to shock the ordinary
sense of decency or propriety-has been held an actionable
invasion of the right of privacy. To so hold would mean
that plaintiffs ''under all conceivable circumstances had an
absolute legal right to [prevent publication of] any photograph of them taken without their consent. If every person
has such a right, no [periodical] could lawfully publish a
photograph of a parade or a street scene. We are not prepared to sustain the assertion of such a right.'' ( Themo v.
New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54 [27 N.E.2d
753, 755] ; see Rest., Torts, vol. 4, § 867, comment c, pp. 399400.) In so concluding, it must be remembered that there
is no contention here that the publication of plaintiffs' photograph was for advertising or trade purposes. ( 41 Am.Jur.,
Privacy, § 22, p. 941; e.g. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190 [50 S.E. 68, 106 Am.St.Rep. 104, 2 Ann.
Cas. 561, 69 L.R.A. 101}; Kunz v Allen, 102 Kans. 883 [172
P. 532, L.R.A. 1918D 1151] ; also 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 102, 103.)
As heretofore indicated, however, we conclude that plaintiffs should have been accorded the right to amend their com-
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plaint, and that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining defendants' demurrer without leave to amend.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in that part of the majority decision which reverses the judgment for refusal of the trial
court to allow plaintiffs to amend. I dissent, however, from
the holding that the publication of the photograph alone
did not violate plaintiffs' right of privacy.
It is difficult to ascertain upon what ground the majority
opinion rests as will hereafter appear. As outlined in Gill
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal.2d 273 [239 P.2d 630], and authorities there cited, there are two main questions involved
in right of privacy cases : ( 1) Is the publication of a character which would offend the feelings and sensibilities of the
ordinary person; and (2) if it does so offend, is there such
a public interest in the subject matter of the publication
with reference to its news or educational significance that
it may be published with impunity. In the first instance the
question is whether there has been any tort (violation of the
right of privacy) committed, and in the second, having found
the tort, is it privileged.
Referring to the second question first, it should be quite
obvious that there is no news or educational value whatsoever
in the photograph alone. It depicts two persons (plaintiffs)
in an amorous pose. There is nothing to show whether they
are or are not married. While some remote news significance
might be attached to persons in such a pose on the theory
that the public likes and is entitled to see persons in such
a pose, there is no reason why the publisher need invade the
privacy of John and Jane Doe for his purpose. He can
employ models for that purpose and the portion of the public
interested will never know the difference but its maudlin
curiosity will be appeased.
For the same reasons the discussion in the majority opinion
to the effect that plaintiffs consented to the publication because they assumed the pose in a public place is fallacious.
But in addition, such a theory is completely at odds with
the violation of the right of privacy. By plaintiffs' doing
what they did in view of a tiny fraction of the public, does
not mean that they consented to observation by the millions
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of readers of the defendant's magazine. In effect, the majority holding means that anything anyone does outside of
his own home is with consent to the publication thereof, because, under those circumstances he waives his right of privacy even though there is no news value in the event. If
such were the case, the blameless exposure of a portion of
the naked body of a man or woman in a public place as the
result of inefficient buttons, hooks or other clothes-holding
devices could be freely photographed and widely published
with complete immunity. The majority opinion confuses the
situation, as have some of the other cases, with the question
of newsworthiness. It has been said that when a person is
involved in either a public or private event, voluntarily or
involuntarily, of news value, he has waived his right of
privacy. Plainly such is not the case where the event
is involuntary such as the victim of a holdup. As we said
in Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273, 281: "It
should be observed, that referring to the use of a person's
likeness for a legitimate public interest as not actionable
because it indicates a waiver by the person of his right, is
of doubtful validity, for it has been applied whether the
publication having news value arose out of an incident of
his own making or involuntarily and without his fault thrust
upon him." There is no basis for the conclusion that the
second a person leaves the portals of his home he consents
to have his photograph taken under all circumstances thereafter. There being no legitimate public interest, there is no
excuse for the publication.
The first ground, that the picture would not offend the
senses of an ordinary person, is equally untenable. It is
alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, and admitted by the demurrer
that it so offended them. It is then a matter of proof at
the trial. Certainly reasonable men could view the picture
as showing plaintiffs in a sultry or sensual pose. For this
court to say as a matter of law that such portrayal would not
seriously offend the feelings of an ordinary man is to take
an extreme view, to say the least. The question is one for
the trier of fact. (Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d
273, 280.) If it is in part a question of law it is so only
. to the extent that the rig·ht does not extend to '' supersensitiveness or agoraphobia." (41 Am.Jur., Privacy, § 12.) An
examination of the photograph shows that it would offend the
feelings of persons other than oversensitive ones.
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Finally, adding to the confusion of the precise ground upon
which it rests, the majority opinion makes point of the fact
that the picture was not used for advertising purposes, and
that if it did not hold as it does, there would be liability for
a person's picture appearing among others in a parade. Obviously the first has no bearing upon whether an ordinary
man would be offended. The offense would exist or not exist
regardless of whether it was used for advertising. The second
adds nothing because the parade and those engaging in it
are matters of public interest and the persons engaging therein
are intentionally placing themselves on public displayparade.
In announcing a rule of law defining the right of a private
citizen to be left alone, and not have his photograph published
to the four winds, especially when he is depicted in an uncomplimentary pose, courts should consider the effect of such
publication upon the sensibility of the ordinary private citizen, and not upon the sensibility of those persons who seek
and enjoy publicity and notoriety and seeing their pictures
on public display, or those who are in the "public eye"
such as public officials, clergymen, lecturers, actors and others
whose professional careers bring them in constant contact
with the public and in whom the public or some segment
thereof is interested. Obviously anything the latter group
may do or say has news or educational value-such cannot
be said of the persons engaged in private business or employment who constitute more than 90 per cent of our population. These private citizens, who desire to be left alone,
should have and enjoy a right of privacy so long as they
do nothing which can reasonably be said to have news value.
Certainly this right is entitled to protection. It seems to
me that the law should be so molded as to protect the right
of the 90 per cent who do not desire publicity or notoriety
and who may be offended by publications such as that here
involved. And, when the right of privacy of such a person
is violated, and redress is sought in the courts for the indignity suffered, the courts should apply the general rules
applicable to the redress of wrongs and submit the issues of
fact to a jury when demanded. But the majority of this
court, following its present trend, has again seen fit to deny
plaintiffs their constitutional right to a jury trial on the
issues of fact here presented by arrogating to itself both the
fact-finding and lawmaking power. To this holding I most
emphatically dissent.

